James M. Hosking (*) I. Introduction
For many years arbitration practitioners have grappled with the problem of what to do with a 'non-party' -or more particularly a 'non-signatory' (1) -to the arbitration agreement that is nevertheless integral to the resolution of the dispute that has arisen. To take a simple example, what of the corporate affiliate that has been assigned certain rights and obligations under a subsequently disputed contract: can the affiliate assignee be compelled to arbitrate; can it commence arbitration itself and can it somehow intervene in an arbitration initiated between the original contracting parties? At the heart of these questions lies the widely-accepted principle that arbitration is by its nature consensual. However, in the absence of an agreement containing an arbitration clause and bearing the affiliate assignee's signature, where does one look to find evidence of such consent to arbitration?
Far from being merely theoretical, the questions raised by the aforementioned scenario are in fact highly relevant to the contemporary practice of international commercial arbitration. Disputes involving nonsignatories are inevitable in the context of modern international business transactions that typically involve complex webs of interwoven agreements, multilayered legal obligations and the interposition of numerous, often related, corporate and other entities. Accordingly, while the non-signatory 'problem' has long been associated with disputes arising out of bills of lading and construction sub-contracts, it is today to be found in such diverse contexts as arbitrations concerning reinsurance agreements, Internet-based software licences and investment treaties.
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Perhaps reflecting an increased awareness of this issue, there is a growing body of commentary on the topic. (2) Bearing in mind the volume and breadth of these writings, this article does not attempt to produce an exhaustive analysis of all aspects of the treatment of nonsignatories in international arbitration. Rather, focusing largely on the current position in the United States, it seeks to sketch the broad contours of the debate, with particular emphasis on identifying the legal principles and procedural mechanisms relied upon to justify binding a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement. First, the article briefly discusses some of the major substantive domestic law theories by which it is argued that non-signatories are bound to the arbitration agreement. Secondly, it touches on certain international law and transnational norms asserted to support extending the arbitration agreement to non-signatories. Thirdly, it identifies some of the procedural initiatives employed to bind non-signatories or to mitigate the effects of not being able to bind non-signatories. Finally, it lists some of the issues that cause non-signatories to be particularly problematic in the context of international arbitration. The article concludes by suggesting that an over-zealous approach to 'extending' the arbitration agreement to non-signatories may undermine the fundamental touchstone of arbitration -consent.
II. Reliance on the 'Ordinary Principles of Contract and Agency'
In the United States, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies to any arbitration, the subject matter of which touches or concerns interstate commerce. (3) In the absence of any guidance in the FAA, courts have developed a voluminous (if not always consistent) jurisprudence on when a non-signatory may be bound to an arbitration agreement. The following oft-cited quote summarises the US approach: page "290" Arbitration is contractual by nature … It does not follow, however, that under the [Federal Arbitration] Act an obligation to arbitrate attaches only to one who has personally signed the written arbitration provision. This court has made clear that a non-signatory party may be bound to an arbitration agreement if so dictated by the 'ordinary principles of contract and agency'. (4)
Of course, the real debate centres on what are these 'ordinary principles' and how are they applied. The court in Thomson identified five principles. (5) The author's own research has identified approximately 12: assignment; subrogation; third party beneficiary; novation; incorporation by reference; agency; estoppel/equitable estoppel; assumption of obligation; succession; 'group of companies' doctrine; 'single economic transaction' doctrine; and general reliance on 'equity'. The following is a very brief description of some aspects of the most common (and also most controversial) of these principles, focusing primarily on their application in the United States.
a. Assignment
In most states in the United States, where the rights and obligations under a contract are validly assigned and the assigned contract contains an arbitration provision, that arbitration provision is binding on all parties including the original contracting parties (both promisor and promisee) and the assignee. (6) However, US courts considering this matter tend also to analyse closely the arbitration provision and the assignment agreement to ensure this result is consistent with the parties' intention. (7) This is in contrast to the position in France, where, in the context of international commerce, there is a 'presumption' of 'automatic' transmission of the arbitration agreement as part of the assignment of the contract. (8)
b. Incorporation by Reference
In this situation a contract does not specifically include the arbitration clause but rather includes a term referring to another document (such as a standard contract) which includes the arbitration clause. This issue has long been associated with bills of lading, construction/engineering chains of contract and guarantees. In general, US courts treat this as essentially a factual matter of whether or not page "291"the parties intended to create a binding agreement. (9) Other jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom have struggled with conflicting views on whether or not there must be 'distinct and specific words' specifically referring to the arbitration clause in order for it to be incorporated by reference. (10)
c. Third Party Beneficiary
Broadly speaking, the third party beneficiary doctrine provides that in certain circumstances a non-signatory who has received benefits under the main contract is entitled to demand performance of those benefits. Where that main contract contains an arbitration provision, is the third party bound by it? US case law is surprisingly inconsistent, however in general 'the mere status of the third party beneficiary imposes no duty to arbitrate … [however] doing so is a condition to the third party beneficiary's enforcing its rights' under that contract, (11) i.e., the third party beneficiary is only bound to arbitrate where it is the claimant in a claim relying on the main agreement. (12) In keeping with the general US contract approach, the third party must be an intended beneficiary, although evidence of this may be drawn from the writing itself and the surrounding circumstances. (13) In 1999 the United Kingdom enacted legislation recognising the third party beneficiary doctrine and, after much equivocating, explicitly extending this doctrine to arbitration agreements. (14) Interestingly, the drafters moved from an initial position of considering it inappropriate for the statute to apply to arbitration provisions as this would impose 'duties and burdens' (15) on a third party, to instead viewing the arbitration agreement as a 'condition' to enforcing the 'benefit' conferred by the doctrine. (16) The new legislation has so far attracted little judicial attention and it remains to be seen to what extent, if any, the US model will be followed.
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Where an agreement containing an arbitration clause has been entered into by a person who expressly or impliedly did so as a representative of a principal, that non-signatory principal may be bound to the arbitration agreement. (17) An agent that executes a contract on behalf of a disclosed principal generally will not be held compelled to arbitrate against its wishes. (18) However, in some US circuits, a non-signatory agent may be permitted to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement contained in the contract the agent signed in his or her capacity as a corporate director, officer or employee where he or she would otherwise be required to defend the claim in court. (19) This is most common where the agent is named as a co-defendant and is apparently justified on the theory that if a signatory 'can avoid the practical consequences of an agreement to arbitrate by naming nonsignatory parties as [defendants] in his complaint, or signatory parties in their individual capacities only, the effect of the rule requiring arbitration would, in effect, be nullified'. (20) This highly pragmatic approach to agency theory sometimes also becomes expressed in terms of other theories, e.g., that the signatory is estopped from denying that the arbitration provision applies to the non-signatory agent (21) or that the agent has by his or her behaviour assumed the duty to arbitrate. (22) e. Estoppel/Equitable Estoppel In general, this theory applies where a party by its own conduct is prevented from denying that the other party at issue is entitled to rely on an arbitration agreement. page "293"US courts have recognised at least two distinct versions of this. (23) First, courts have compelled a nonsignatory to arbitrate where the non-signatory knowingly exploits or directly receives a 'benefit' from the agreement containing the arbitration clause. (24) In such instances, courts have allowed estoppel to be used as a proverbial 'sword' rather than 'shield,' i.e., empowering the signatory to demand arbitration of a claim. (25) Secondly, courts have compelled arbitration based on an analysis of (1) the relationship between the claim and the contract containing the arbitration clause and (2) the existence of a 'nexus between the parties'. (26) The broad language of this latter test has been especially fertile ground for arguments that in effect use merely the close relationship of the signatory and the non-signatory as the basis for implied consent to arbitration. (27) The concern with both these variations of the estoppel doctrine is that they often result in highly fact-specific decisions and sometimes appear to be used as an 'easy option' rather than applying a more rigorous legal analysis using traditional principles of contract and agency law.
f. 'Group of Companies' Doctrine
For the purpose of this article, the 'group of companies' doctrine refers to the common situation where an agreement containing an arbitration provision was signed by one company but is sought to be enforced against, or relied upon by, other members of the related group of companies or the signatory company's shareholders or its officers and directors. (28) Although not always explicitly page "294"analysed in this way, such situations in fact involve applying different legal theories, including 'piercing the corporate veil', (29) 'alter ego', (30) agency, (31) fraud (32) and estoppel. (33) Ignoring these distinctions, some US courts have asserted a more general principle that 'when the charges against a parent company and its subsidiary are based on the same facts and are inherently inseparable, a court may refer claims against the [nonsignatory] parent to arbitration … If the parent corporation was forced to try the case, the arbitration proceedings would be rendered meaningless and the federal policy in favor of arbitration effectively thwarted'. (34) Generally, courts are less willing to 'allow the person who is trying to blur the line between corporations and the party who controls the corporation to be advantaged'. (35) While US courts' application of this broad general doctrine is not dissimilar to the position in certain civil law jurisdictions, (36) to the extent such an approach goes beyond the applicable law's principles for respecting corporate personality, this may undermine the business certainty required in typical complex multicorporate transactions. Question whether it would be preferable to subject the facts to a conflict of law analysis to identify the applicable corporate law and then determine on the basis of that law whether the arbitration agreement should be extended to corporate affiliates.
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The status of the non-signatory is generally left to be considered by application of the relevant domestic law. However, practitioners should not overlook assistance from relevant international agreements or statements of general principles of international law. In terms of the former, a US court has relied on certain provisions of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods in holding a non-signatory manufacturer bound to arbitrate. (37) In terms of the latter, both the United Nations Compensation Commission to Administer Claims Arising out of the Gulf War (38) and the Iran-US Claims Tribunal (39) have recognised certain 'international usages' and 'general principles of law' applicable to third parties, including subrogation, (40) third party beneficiary (41) and equitable estoppel. (42) Similarly, it could be argued that where the parties have manifested consent to do so, binding a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement is consistent with the principle of 'good faith' that is embedded in the lex mercatoria. (43) More boldly, in extending an arbitration provision to a non-signatory, the Paris Court of Appeals has suggested the existence of a transnational norm generally applicable to international arbitration law: 'In international arbitration law, the effects of the arbitration clause extend to parties directly involved in the performance of the contract, provided that their respective situations and activities raise the presumption that they were aware of the existence and scope of the arbitration clause so that the arbitrator can consider all economic and legal aspects of the dispute'. (44)
IV. Reliance on Procedural Mechanisms
There are also various relevant 'procedural' initiatives that have been introduced in treaties, statutes, court rules and the rules of arbitral institutions. The rationale for these procedural mechanisms is not to permit arbitration with non-signatories page "296"but rather to overcome the practical disadvantages occasioned by contemporaneous arbitration proceedings or litigation concerning the same issues of law or fact as in the instant arbitration. In short, such mechanisms are employed to avoid unnecessary duplication, save time and money and avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions. (45) The following provides an overview of some of the more important devices. (46) a. Joinder of a Third Party Non-Signatory Generally, in the absence of agreement between all parties or the application of one of the legal theories discussed supra, there is no power for a tribunal or supervisory court to compel joinder of a nonsignatory. However, consent to permit joinder may be inferred from consent to a particular institution's rules. In this respect, an important initiative is found in the LCIA Rules 1988, Rule 22.1(h), empowering (unless otherwise excluded by the parties) the tribunal to order 'upon the application of a party, [that] one or more third persons … be joined in the arbitration as a party, provided any such third person and the applicant party have consented thereto in writing'. Thus, consent of the party being joined and the applicant is still required. In contrast, Rules of the Court of Arbitration for Sport, Rule 41.2 provides a broader power, more similar to that enjoyed in litigation, permitting a tribunal to compel a third party to be joined (although the third party must still be bound by the arbitration agreement or have consented to joinder).
b. Consolidation of Proceedings
Closely related to the issue of joinder is the concern relating to disputes arising under separate agreements (or even the same agreement), whereby parties may be obliged to conduct separate arbitration proceedings with different parties (or even the same parties) concerning what may be essentially the same or closely related issues of fact and law. The question arises whether an arbitral panel or institution or the courts of the forum are permitted to 'consolidate' such proceedings.
In the United States, the majority of the federal circuits apply a straightforward rule that a court may not order consolidation of arbitration proceedings unless the underlying agreement contains an explicit provision authorising consolidation. 
c. Other Procedural Mechanisms
Generally, intervention of a third party in the arbitration (in the true litigation sense) is impermissible. Some limited right of intervention is expressly permitted in certain circumstances where the third party may be a signatory to the treaty or page "298"agreement providing jurisdiction to the tribunal but where its interest in the particular dispute is more tangential. (57) Under the former UK Arbitration Act 1975, there was some scope for indirect relief for third party non-signatories who claimed 'through or under' a party to an arbitration agreement. In Roussel-Uclaf v. G.D. Searle & Co. Ltd, (58) the court granted a stay of litigation to a subsidiary whose parent company was a party to a licence agreement containing an arbitration provision. The court applied an indirect veilpiercing argument to hold that the parent and subsidiary were 'so closely related on the facts in this case' that the subsidiary was 'within the purview of the arbitration clause' and could thereby claim 'through or under' the parent. The UK Arbitration Act 1996 contains a similar provision of potentially broader application. (59) This indirect method of treating a non-signatory as claiming 'through or under' a party to the arbitration agreement has been considered elsewhere in the Commonwealth. (60) Various statutory provisions and court rules may also be used to lessen the procedural difficulty faced by the non-party, e.g., in certain circumstances in the United States a non-signatory may seek a stay of litigation pending the outcome of a related arbitration to which it is not a party. 
b. Subsequent Challenge to Award: Setting Aside and Enforcement
Of course, even if successful in compelling a non-signatory to arbitrate, there is still the risk that a losing non-signatory may 're-litigate' the issue in seeking to set aside the resulting award or in defending against enforcement thereof. Thus, in the well-known Westland Helicopters case, the Swiss courts set aside an interim award (69) with respect to certain respondents on the basis that the arbitration agreement page "300"could not be extended to the Arab states that controlled the signatory trading entity. (70) More recently, a New York federal court rejected a similar argument and enforced an award rendered by an Egyptian arbitral tribunal that had found a US parent non-signatory bound by the arbitration agreement and therefore jointly and severally liable with its subsidiary for damages. (71) The court refused to revisit the tribunal's finding that the parent was bound by the agreement and held that none of the parent company's arguments constituted grounds on which enforcement could be denied under New York Convention, Article V. (72) In particular, it found that the proposition that nonsignatories could be bound to an arbitration agreement did not contravene US public policy for the purpose of Article V(1)(e). (73) Conversely, some parties have saved their 'third party' arguments until after an award has been obtained against the signatory. Thus, in Diners Club, the successful franchisee claimant, having had its award against the franchisor recognised and reduced to a judgment, was able to enforce the judgment against the insolvent franchisor's solvent parent company. (74) However, clearly, an arbitration panel will have exceeded its authority if its award seeks directly to vest legal rights or obligations in a third party. (75) 
c. Who Decides Whether a Non-Signatory is Properly a Party to the Arbitration?
In the United States, contrary to the position in many jurisdictions, '[u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator'. (76) This general principle has been recently reaffirmed by the US Supreme Court. (77) page "301"Thus, commencing arbitration involving a non-signatory has the potential to result in pre-arbitration litigation and thereby add expense and delay.
d. Applicable Law
Especially in the international context, the issue is further complicated by the question of the law applicable to determining whether the nonsignatory is bound to arbitrate. 'From a methodological point of view, it seems that in many cases, the arbitral tribunal determines separately the law applicable to the various contracts, even if it reaches the conclusion that the applicable law is the same for all of them'. (78) Thus, for example, the effect of assignment may be construed according to the law applicable to the original contract assigned, the assignment agreement, the arbitration agreement or the law of the forum. (79) To confuse matters even more, the decision-maker may reach a different conclusion as to what law is to govern the question of whether the formality requirements of New York Convention, Article II have been met. (80) The decision-maker may also apply different conflict of law rules depending on whether the non-signatory issue is considered to involve a procedural or a substantive matter or, by default, may rely simply on the parties' expectations in this respect. (81) e. Separability of the Arbitration Agreement: Where Does One Look for Consent?
The generally-accepted notion of the arbitration agreement being 'separable' from the main agreement gives rise to the question of whether the parties must have consented to the non-signatory being bound by the arbitration agreement itself or whether this can be inferred from consent to be bound by the contract as a whole. Generally in the United States, the focus is heavily on the wording of the arbitration agreement and whether that itself evidences an intent to bind the nonsignatory; (82) however, the 'factual and conceptual nexus between the arbitration clause and the principal contract is … sometimes difficult to overlook'. (83) By contrast, at least in the context of assignment, the French courts have 'consistently rejected' the notion that one must prove a separate intent to be bound by the arbitration agreement. (84) f. Consequences of Adding an Extra 'Party' Finally, as a practical matter, where the 'extension' of an arbitration provision to include a non-signatory results in an extra party being added to a proceeding, it page "302"is likely to interfere with such issues as appointment of the tribunal and sharing of arbitration costs. Absent agreement by the parties, this may necessitate intervention by the arbitral institution or courts. Indeed, some arbitral institution rules specifically address joint nominations and/or in the absence of agreement reserve the right to make appointments in these unexpected multiparty situations. (85)
VI. Conclusion
A review of the theories, principles and procedures employed to bind non-signatories, reveals -perhaps unsurprisingly -that the 'touchstone' for this determination is whether or not the relevant entities consented to arbitrate with one another. Indeed, from a comparative law perspective, what might at first appear to be distinctions between jurisdictions, are often simply a matter of how far a decision-maker is willing to go to find evidence of such consent. Must it be explicit in the original agreement or is it sufficient to find it implicit within the language of the agreement? Can one infer it from the conduct of the parties or perhaps from an economic analysis of the benefits of the transaction? Should it be measured at the time of contracting or can it be assessed on the basis of subsequent acts?
While the case law generally shows a deference to consent, especially in the United States one finds that it sometimes takes a backseat to such notions as 'the need for efficiency' or upholding the 'presumption of arbitrability'. One also finds instances of sweeping and fact-intensive application of such principles as equitable estoppel and piercing the corporate veil, that are beyond the normal reach of those doctrines. Indeed, sometimes even where consent is insufficiently manifested to permit 'extension' of the agreement to bind the non-signatory, procedural mechanisms are employed to achieve the same result.
A commentator once observed that 'justice would not seem to be done if the only criterion' used in denying consent to arbitration were 'that a particular third party did not itself sign … the arbitration clause'. (86) Certainly, many of the scenarios outlined in this article in which a nonsignatory has been compelled or permitted to arbitrate involve an indisputably 'just' outcome. However, ultimately, arbitration is not litigation and it has inherent limitations on the extent to which it can accommodate non-signatories. Accordingly, while this area is ripe with opportunities for creative advocacy, one should be vigilant not to damage the legitimacy of arbitration by undermining the essential requirement of consent. page "303" * Associate in the international arbitration group of Clifford Chance's New York office. This article is based on a paper presented at the LCIA/AMINZ conference held in Auckland, New Zealand on 20 February 2003 but has been updated to reflect legal developments to 31 December 2003. 1 The term 'non-signatory' is used to refer to an entity that has not physically signed the agreement containing the arbitration provision. On some theories a non-signatory may in fact be a 'party' to the agreement, e.g., where a principal is bound by the signature of his or her agent. To avoid confusion this article generally refers to the broader class of 'non-signatories' rather than 'non-parties'. where the subject matter is a purely domestic arbitration, the same general approach would apply as in an international dispute. (estopping plaintiffs from denying that arbitration agreement also applied to parents of signatory subsidiaries where the issues the nonsignatories were seeking to arbitrate were intertwined with the contract
